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Abstract
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This paper analyzes how the employment/productivity 
profile of growth and its sectoral pattern are correlated 
with poverty reduction. The authors use a sample of 104 
short-run growth spells in developing countries, between 
1980 and 2001. They also identify some conditions of 
the labor market and the economic environment that are 
associated with employment-intensive growth or specific 
sectoral growth.
   The results show that, in the short run, although the 
aggregate employment-rate intensity of growth does 
not matter for poverty reduction any more than the 
aggregate productivity intensity of growth, the sectoral 
pattern of employment growth and productivity growth 
is important. Employment-intensive growth in the 
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as transition channel between growth and poverty reduction and to identify effective policies for the creation of more and 
better jobs. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may 
be contacted at  ppaci@worldbank.org, cgutierrez2@worlbank.org 
secondary sector is associated with decreases in poverty, 
while employment-intensive growth in agriculture is 
correlated with poverty increases. Similarly, productivity-
intensive growth in agriculture is associated with 
decreases in poverty.
  Although the study does not address causality, 
coincidence of these phenomena in this large sample of 
heterogeneous countries and periods suggests that, in 
the short run, the sectoral productivity and employment 
pattern of growth may have important implications 
for poverty alleviation. Therefore, policies for reducing 
poverty should not overlook the sectoral productivity and 
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Introduction 
There is at present a large literature that has studied how growth and distributional 
changes affect poverty.
1  These studies have found that, although growth makes up for an 
important share of changes in poverty, there is a wide disparity in the extent of poverty 
reduction a growth process can achieve. As a result, a growing literature is now studying 
the question of what factors—such as sectors, initial inequality or endowments, 
government interventions, or the sectoral growth pattern— explain the differing impacts 
of growth on poverty.
2  However, the role of labor markets has received substantially less 
attention despite the obvious fact that the poor derive most of their income from work.
3 
Among policymakers, on the other hand, there has been a growing concern with “jobless 
growth” as a major obstacle for the poor to benefit from the positive growth performance 
experienced by many countries worldwide. This appears intuitive, as the poor derive most 
of their income/consumption from work:  as employees, as the self-employed, or in 
subsistence activities. Therefore, the impact of growth on poverty is seen as depending on 
the extent to which growth generates employment and good earning opportunities.   
However, if employment growth is achieved at the expense of wage reductions, it may 
have a meager impact on poverty. Moreover, since in many low income countries the 
poor cannot afford to be unemployed, policies should be more concerned with raising the 
income of the working poor.  Another recurrent issue for the policy discussion is whether 
poverty is more effectively reduced by a growth pattern that favors the sectors of the 
economy in which the poor are found (i.e., agriculture) in order to enhance employment 
opportunities or by a pattern that disproportionately advances the sectors in which the 
poor are not found, so that more of the poor can be drawn into the higher earning parts of 
the economy.
4 This issue is more important if the poor face extensive barriers to gaining 
access to the higher earning sectors. 
Despite the clear importance of these questions for the successful shared growth 
strategies in low-income countries (LICs), they remain largely unexplored in the current 
literature and this significantly undermines the ability to provide sound evidence-based 
policy advice in this area. At the core of this debate are the questions of which sectoral 
growth patterns achieve greater poverty reduction (i.e., is agricultural growth better for 
reducing poverty than manufacturing growth?) as well as of whether productivity-
intensive growth or employment-intensive growth is more effective. Equally important is 
the question of which policies are better suited to fostering poverty reducing growth 
patterns. The purpose of this paper is to deepen the understanding of these issues, 
                                                 
1 For cross-country evidence of the link between poverty and growth, see Besley and Burgess (2004), Bourguignon 
(2002),Dollar and Kraay (2002), Kraay (2006), López (2004) and Ravallion (2005); for cross-regional and time series, 
see Ravallion and Chen (2004) and Ravallion and Datt (2002); for micro analysis, see Bibi (2005), Contreras (2001), 
and Menezes-Filho and Vasconcellos (2004). 
2 See, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2002), Kraay (2006), Ravallion (2005), Ravallion  (2005), Ravallion and Datt 
(2002), Loayza and Raddatz (2006), and Bourguignon (2002).   
3 This point has been made before by Agenor (2004), Satchi and Temple (2006), and Rama and Artecona (2002). 
4 Achieving economic development by moving people out of the poorer sectors and into the richer ones has been 
labeled “intersectoral shifts.” Both the Lewis and the Kuznets models are models of intersectoral shifts. These and later 
contributions are reviewed in Basu (1997). 
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providing empirical input into the debate by (i) studying the aggregate and sectoral 
employment/productivity profile of growth and its correlation with observed poverty 
changes, and (ii) going beyond the study of the link between the profile of growth and 
poverty and into the provision of some preliminary evidence as to which market 
conditions and economic policies help in explain the observed profile of growth. 
 
The paper is structured as follows:  section 1 presents a brief review of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence on the link between poverty and growth patterns. Section  2  discusses 
the methodology and data. Section   3 illustrates the stylized facts on the correlation 
between the growth patterns and poverty.  Section 4 analyzes the effects of growth 
patterns on poverty and discusses which labor market and macroeconomic conditions 
explain the observed growth patterns. Section 5 presents the paper’s conclusions. 
 
1  Conceptual Framework:  Why Would the Sectoral Growth Pattern 
or Its Employment Profile Matter for Poverty? 
 
As mentioned above, there is a growing literature that is studying which factors (such as 
sectors, initial inequality or endowments, government interventions, or the sectoral 
pattern of growth) explain the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty.
5 Among this 
literature an important set of papers has concentrated on the sectoral growth pattern. For 
example, Loayza and Raddatz (2006) find that growth in unskilled intensive sectors 
contributed to changes in poverty, after controlling for average growth. Ravallion and 
Datt (2002) link sectoral value added growth to poverty changes in India, and find that 
growth in agriculture helped reduce poverty while growth in manufacturing did not. 
Satchi and Temple (2006) show how dualism (created by frictions rather than by 
institutionally set wages) may play an important role in how the growth pattern translates 
into rises in employment and wages, and that while growth in agriculture potentially 
raises poverty, urban growth reduces poverty.
6  Other policy-oriented research has 
reached similar conclusions. For example, World Bank (2005) studied 11 countries and 
found evidence that access to non-farm rural employment and informal urban 
employment eased the poor’s participation in the growth process. Other papers have 
concentrated on understanding the role of employment or productivity in shared growth. 
World Bank (2005) found that in 3 of the 14 countries studied pro-poor growth was 
associated with more labor-intensive growth.
7  In a related analysis, Islam (2004) uses a 
cross-country sample of 23 developing countries to find out whether the employment 
intensity of growth in manufacturing contributes to explain poverty reduction, but finds 
that results are not robust to the inclusion of per capita GDP growth.  Prasada Rao et al.  
(2004) find that the significance of output per worker in explaining poverty reduction is 
not robust to the inclusion of the log of GDP per capita, or the estimation period.
8  More 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2002), Kraay (2006), Ravallion (2005), Ravallion and Chen (2004), Ravallion 
and Datt (2002), Loayza and Raddatz (2006), and Bourguignon (2002).   
6 The authors do not explicitly consider poverty outcomes, but rather the effects of different types of growth on wages.  
7 These three countries were Indonesia, Vietnam, and Tunisia. 
8 The results suggest that the mentioned variables do not have an effect independent of the effect they have on GDP per 
capita, or alternatively that they are a proxy for it, when included on their own.   5
recently, a study by Kakwani, Neri and Son (2006) decomposes the sources of pro-poor 
growth in a case study for Brazil. The authors find that productivity was the major labor 
income source of pro-poor growth, while the role of employment growth was small. The 
role of productivity growth in agriculture on poverty has also been the focus of much 
work. The results from Computable General Equilibrium literature suggest that factor 
market assumptions and agricultural trade are crucial in determining the poverty reducing 
impact of agricultural productivity.  Coxhead and Warr (1995), for example, find that, 
assuming full labor mobility and product prices given by world markets, rises in 
agricultural productivity reduced poverty. On the other hand, Fane and Warr (2002) find 
that agricultural productivity has a meager effect on poverty.
9  In an empirical paper Datt 
and Ravallion (1998) find that productivity growth in India decreased poverty. 
 
The empirical evidence from country case studies discussed above appears to point to the 
fact that the sectoral growth pattern and its employment and productivity profile matter 
for poverty alleviation. This fact should come as no surprise because the poor and the 
non-poor own factors in different proportions; as long as different growth patterns affect 
factor demands and factor returns differently, their poverty impact is likely to differ.   It is 
less clear from the evidence as to whether productivity or employment growth is at the 
core of reduction in poverty, nor as to the sectors in which growth has more impact.  Nor 
is it clear as to whether general patterns hold across many countries, as most of the 
studies are country specific.  
 
With some notable exceptions (Satchi and Temple, 2006, and Loayza and Raddatz, 
2006), the available theoretical models yield little insight into these issues. In a simple 
competitive supply and demand framework, with no frictions or barriers to mobility, the 
economy is always at “full employment,” employment rates are always one, and so there 
is no scope for “employment (rate) intensive growth.” That is, there is no space for 
growth to modify the employment rate. Although there would be no role for 
“employment-intensive growth,” the sectoral pattern of growth would still matter:   
growth in a sector would raise the demand for labor and would raise wages everywhere 
uniformly, but the amount of upward pressure exerted on wages would depend on the 
amount of labor the growing sector is demanding.  More labor-intensive sectors would 
generate a higher demand for labor for each “unit” of growth (for example, a 1 percent 
growth in an employment-intensive sector would exert a higher pressure on wages than a 
1 percent growth in a capital intensive sector).  Under perfect mobility and factor price 
equalization, growth in sectors such as agriculture (which is mostly labor-intensive in 
developing countries) would achieve a greater reduction of poverty than, for example, 
growth in high tech manufacturing or utilities, which could be less labor-intensive.
10  
 
In models with friction and barriers to mobility (e.g., search and matching models), or in 
models of labor market segmentation, there is space for employment-intensive growth—
that is, growth that is accompanied by increases in the employment rate. The theoretical 
literature on labor markets in developing countries stresses the duality and segmentation 
                                                 
9 The crucial assumptions in explaining these differing results are whether or not the lower prices brought about by 
higher productivity are compensated through higher demand for the products.  Both models assume that labor is 
perfectly mobile and factors equate across sectors. 
10 See Loayza and Raddatz (2006) for a model that deals with this mechanism.   6
of these labor markets.
11  At the core of this model is the idea that there is a “bad jobs 
sector” and a “good jobs sector.”
12  In the good jobs sector productivity is higher and so 
wages are higher. In the bad jobs sector productivity is low and income from self-
employment/wages is low. Because productivity in the bad jobs sectors is low, 
households that earn a living in the bad jobs sector are more likely to be poorer than the 
rest.  Jobs in the good jobs sectors are rationed because wages are institutionally set 
above the competitive market clearing level. There may be minimum wages, unions may 
bargain for higher wages, firms may set “efficiency wages” and so on. Movement 
between the bad jobs sector and the good jobs sector may be limited, and people queue 
for a good job.  On top of the limited mobility created by institutionally set wages, there 
may be geographic barriers to mobility.  For example, many bad sector jobs may be in 
rural areas and migration to urban areas may be costly and risky, as there may be a lack 
of roads and little property rights enforcement on land for those who leave their land. 
There may also be barriers to mobility caused by discrimination and segregation, as good 
jobs may be given only to those of a certain ethnic group or a particular gender. 
Similarly, good jobs may be reserved for those with a certain education so that the 
unskilled poor may be left out of the good jobs sector.
13  Besides being employed, agents 
may be in the non-employment state, either searching and queuing for a job or being out 




Under such models the sectoral pattern of growth may have a crucial role in alleviating 
poverty. For example, if there are extensive barriers to mobility between sectors so that 
factor returns do not equate across sectors, then growth in the sectors in which the poor 
are found may be more effective at moving people out of poverty than growth in the 
sectors to which the poor have limited mobility. If there are no extensive barriers to 
mobility, then, growth in the good jobs sectors may be more effective in pulling people 
into the higher earning sectors and out of poverty. On the other hand, the distribution of 
the poor between the non-employment state and the bad jobs sector will determine 
whether cutting unemployment and raising participation rates or moving people out of the 
bad jobs sector will have a greater impact on poverty. It will also determine the trade-offs 
of different policies. 
 
                                                 
11 Labor market segmentation is now part of the standard labor economic textbooks (see, for example, Borjas [1996], 
Bosworth et al. [1996], and Layard, Nickel, and Jackson [1991]). The main reason is that it offers a better explanation 
for some empirical observations than the competitive model. An often-quoted example is the persistent existence of 
intra-industry wage differentials for observationally equivalent workers (Katz and Summers [1988]).  For other 
contributions, see Dickens and Lang (1985) and Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989). 
12 The bad jobs sector is usually associated with the agricultural sector or the informal sector and the good jobs sector is 
generally associated with the industrial or modern sector or the formal sector.  We believe that these distinctions may 
be too simplifying and that the division of the labor market between good and bad jobs goes beyond the 
formal/informal or agricultural/industrial divide. 
13 For example, in several African economies the best jobs are those in the public sector, and only the educated have 
access to these jobs.  In Nicaragua, to be able to work in many of the maquila firms a person is required to have 
completed secondary education.   
14 In South Africa anecdotal evidence suggests that the informal sector is not a free entry sector: those who want to 
operate informally require “connection” with government officials. In countries such as Peru informal workers are 
subject to illegal “taxing” by local power groups.     7
A thorough analysis of the mechanism through which the sectoral pattern of growth and 
its productivity or employment intensity affect poverty requires a general equilibrium 
approach, as the results hinge on important assumptions about the labor and product 
markets. Such a model is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the aim of this paper is 
mostly empirical. We hope that by highlighting the observed correlations between the 
growth patterns and poverty for many countries we can provide some empirical input into 
the debate on how employment generation and productivity growth affect poverty in the 
short run. It is important to emphasize that the evidence provided here is not asserting 
causality, but rather the coincidence of phenomena that might or might not have a causal 
interpretation. Whether a causal interpretation can be given will depend largely on the 
theoretical model that one believes underlies the observed relationships.  
2   Methodology and Data 
2.1  Profiling growth:  A Shapley decomposition approach  
 
The first task in understanding how the sectoral growth patterns and their employment 
and productivity profile affect poverty is to find a suitable methodology to profile growth. 
Ideally, the methodology should be able to provide some measures of how employment-
intensive or productivity-intensive a growth process is, and how this intensity is 
distributed across sectors of economic activity.  
 
A simple way of understanding how growth is associated with increases in productivity 
and employment at the aggregate level and by sectors is to perform a simple 
decomposition of per capita GDP growth in three components: productivity changes, 
employment rate changes and demographic changes.
15  In doing so, it should be noted 








** ye a ω =   
 
                                                 
15 We will depart from the most common measure of employment-intensive growth: the partial elasticity of 
employment with respect to growth  */ * EY YE ∂∂ , which is obtained by regressing the log of aggregate 
employment against the log of total GDP, aggregate wages and other controls. There are both conceptual and empirical 
difficulties with this measure. Conceptually, the employment elasticity of growth looks at changes in the level of 
employment, not at changes in employment rates. We believe that what matters for poverty reduction is not the 
absolute number of employed, but the number of employed relative to the labor force: positive employment elasticity 
might very well be consistent with growing unemployment rates.  This is particularly important for developing 
countries where population growth accounts for an important fraction of labor force growth. From the empirical point 
of view, the partial elasticity of employment with respect to growth has two difficulties.  Arriving at consistent 
estimates at the aggregate level is a rather difficult task (see Hammermesh 1986, 1993).  But perhaps most important 
for our purposes, it is rarely the case that enough data are available to adequately estimate the partial elasticity for a 
large number of countries.  
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where Y is value added, E is employment, A is the population of working age and N is the 
total population. The ratio ω=Y /E corresponds to output per worker, e=E/A corresponds 
to the share of the working age population employed and a=A/N corresponds to the share 
of the population of working age, that is, the ratio of working age population to total 
population.  
 
















⎝⎠ ∑  
 
where the sub-index s stands for the sector of economic activity.  
 
Our purpose is to describe growth (changes in per capita value added) through growth in 
each of its components, that is, changes in ω, e, and a; and changes in the vectors of 
sectoral labor productivities and employment (ω1,ω2,…,ωs) and (e1, e2, …,es). One such 
methodology is to use Shapley decompositions.
16  The Shapley decomposition approach 
is based on the marginal effect on the value of a variable or indicator of eliminating the 
change in each of the contributory factors in a sequence. The method then assigns to each 
factor the average of its marginal contribution in all possible elimination sequences (see 
Shorrocks, 1999). For example, in Equation 1, the amount of growth that can be 
attributed to changes in output per worker (ω) would be obtained by calculating the 
resulting growth in per capita value added under the hypothetical scenario in which 
employment rates (e) and the share of the working age population (a) had remained 
constant, but output per worker had changed as observed. The difference between the 
resulting hypothetical growth and the observed growth is defined as the contribution of 
changes in output per worker to per capita value added growth. The Annex describes the 
decomposition in greater detail. 
 
Shapley decompositions have the advantage of being additive. In other words, let ω ,  e  
and  a  be the marginal contribution of each component to the observed change in per 









In a similar way decomposing Equation 2 would yield: 
 
                                                 
16 In the case of Equation 1, the easiest way would be to take logarithms and then changes. In the case of Equation 2, 
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In this case e  would be the amount of growth that can be linked to changes in the 
employment rate as measured by the ratio between total employment and the working age 
population. Although employment rates as defined by the ILO measure the population 
that “participates” in the labor market that is employed, throughout this paper the term 
“employment rate” will refer to employment as a fraction of the working age 
population.
17  Increases in employment rates would thus reflect both increases in 
participation and movements of people out of unemployment and into employment.  
 
The term ω  will capture changes in output per worker, but its interpretation is not so 
straightforward. Increases in output per worker can come from three different sources: (i) 
increases in the capital/labor ratio; (ii) increases in total factor productivity (TFP); and 
(iii) relocation of jobs from bad jobs sectors (low productivity) to good jobs sectors (high 
productivity). To see the first two points, it should be noted that under constant returns to 
scale, if Yt=Φtf(Et,Kt) where Kt is the capital stock and Φt a technological parameter 
(which captures TFP growth), then output per worker Yt/Et= Φtf(1,Kt/Et).  Therefore, it 
will capture changes in the capital/labor ratio and in TFP growth.  It should be noted that 
it may also capture cyclical behavior of output: firms operating in economic downturns 
may have underutilized capital; when the demand rises again, it will be reflected as a rise 
in output per worker. The third point is simply the result of workers moving from a low 
productivity sector (or firm) to a high productivity sector (or firm), so that, in the 
aggregate, average output per worker will rise. Throughout this paper we will refer to 
output per worker as productivity, under the understanding that it captures all of the 
above-mentioned factors.  
 
The component a  reflects changes in the demographic structure of the population. For 
example, despite rises in labor productivity and employment, countries with a rapidly 
rising young population may see a decline in per capita income if the employment and 
productivity growth is not sufficient to counter the growing dependency ratio. The same 
might happen with countries that have a rapidly aging population.   
                                                 
17 In developing countries and in particular in low income countries measuring participation is extremely difficult. In 
many cases unemployment is very low but the inactive include agents that are seasonally unemployed and large 
numbers of discouraged workers. We believe that in these cases a better measure of the labor force is the working age 
population rather than those participating actively in the labor market.   10
 
To differentiate sectoral employment/productivity intensity from aggregate intensities, 
we will use sub-indexes. The term  s e  will denote the amount of growth that can be linked 
to changes in the share of employment of sector s. The term  s ω  will denote the amount of 
growth that can be linked to productivity changes in sector s. Again, the productivity term 
will capture TFP growth, changes in the capital/labor ratio and employment shifts within 
the sector.  
 
Aggregate growth can also be profiled in terms of sectoral growth, without discriminating 
between productivity and employment. This is the approach followed by most papers that 
analyze the sectoral growth pattern. In this simple case, the Shapley decomposition boils 
down to aggregate growth just being the sum of growth in each sector multiplied by the 
(average) share of the sector in total value added. This decomposition can thus be 








= ∑  
 
and  s y  would be the amount of growth that can be attributed to value added growth in 
sector s. 
 
Using the methodology described above, a growth episode can be profiled in three 
different ways by the vectors (,,) ea ω , 12 1 2 ( , ,..., ; , ,..., ; ) SS ee ea ω ωω  and  12 ( , ,..., ) S y yy . 
The first vector would profile growth according to aggregate productivity, employment 
and demographic changes. The second vector would profile growth according to changes 
in sectoral productivity, in sectoral employment shares and in aggregate demographic 
changes. And the final vector would profile growth according to its sectoral pattern.  
 
The traditional literature that deals with employment-intensive growth measures it as the 
percent change in employment in response to a 1 percent change in output, that is, the 
employment elasticity of output. Under this measure, however, two countries that have 
the same employment elasticity would be ‘equivalent’, independent of the amount of 
growth in each, despite the fact that the country with the highest growth would generate a 
larger number of new jobs. For example, this measure of employment intensity would 
treat as equivalents a country that grew by 1 percent and a country that grew by 10 
percent as long as they displayed the same employment elasticity, even if they were 
identical in every other dimension. But it is rather unlikely that poverty would have the 
same response in both countries:  with the same employment elasticity one country would 
be generating ten times as much employment as the other. A better measure of 
employment-intensive growth for our purposes would be e . In this case a country that 
experienced a small growth, all of which was linked to changes in employment rates, 
might have the same value of e  as a country that experienced high growth but only 
modest changes in employment rates. As long as the contribution of changes in 
employment rates to aggregate growth is the same, both countries would be equivalent in   11
terms of employment intensity. Therefore, we are taking both factors into consideration: 




2.2  Exploring the link between the sectoral growth pattern, its productivity and 
employment intensity and its poverty reducing impact 
 
Once growth has been profiled, the second step is to link the profile of growth with 
poverty changes. A straightforward method for this would be to regress each of the 
components that profiles growth against percent changes in poverty. This would be the 
equivalent of regressing percent changes in poverty against aggregate growth (controlling 
for other factors), which is the route followed by the poverty-growth literature.
18  In this 
case, however, we have decomposed aggregate growth into different terms. To analyze 
whether poverty changes are correlated with the aggregate employment and productivity 






β ββ ω β
Δ
=+ + +  
Equation 3 
 
If movements out of non-employment and into employment reduce poverty then we 
would expect the coefficient of e  to be significantly and negatively correlated with 
changes in headcount poverty P.  On the other hand if the income of the poor rises 
because they change from low productivity jobs to high productivity jobs, or because 
their earnings are positively correlated with TFP or the capital/labor ratio, then the 
coefficient on ω  should be significantly and negatively correlated with changes in 
poverty. If increases in the fraction of the working population reduce poverty, then the 
coefficient on a  should be significant and negative. Note that if  123 β ββ == , then 





=+ ,  and what would matter would be 
overall growth rather than its profile. 
 











=+ ∑  
Equation 4 
 
In this case, growth in a particular sector would decrease poverty if its coefficient is 
negative and significant. Finally, to estimate whether the sectoral productivity and 
employment profile of growth is correlated with changes in poverty, we would estimate: 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that most of the poverty-growth literature uses changes in mean survey income as a measure for 
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Equation 5 
 
Interpretation of the coefficients is straightforward.  As all variables are in percentage 
changes, the coefficients are the (partial) elasticity of poverty with respect to our measure 
of employment-intensive growth or productivity-intensive growth. Because of the way 
the decomposition is performed, βs will indicate the percentage change in the headcount 
poverty ratio that is likely to accompany a 1 percent increase in our employment-
intensive measure in sector s. Analogously, the coefficient γs will indicate the percentage 
change in the headcount poverty ratio for a 1 percent growth in our measure of 
productivity-intensive growth in sector s.  
2.3  Which are the determinants of the growth profile? 
 
As mentioned previously, if we find that the profile of growth matters for poverty 
reduction, it is interesting to explore whether there are economic policies or labor market 
conditions that are correlated with particular growth patterns.  
 
To estimate the impact of these underlying determinants, we estimate the following 
equation:  
 
,0 (, ) js j t j x gZ X = =  for   12 1 2 ( , ,... ; , ,..., ; , ) js j j jS j j jS j j xe ee e ω ωωω ∈  
Equation 6 
   
Where  js x  is our measures of employment/productivity-intensive growth in country j in 
sector s, Zj,t=0, is a vector of possible explanatory variable in country j at the beginning of 
the spell (t=0) and Xj, are country specific control variables. 
  
The Zj,t=0 vector will include regulation variables and traditional variables that have been 
associated with growth and that might affect the investment climate in a country or TFP 
growth. By using the explanatory variables at the beginning of the spell, we hope to be 
able to better assess causality. 
2.4  The Data 
 
To analyze whether employment matters for poverty reduction we make use of data on 
total and sectoral GDP, poverty, population and employment. The analysis covers the 




Data on aggregate GDP come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. To 
construct sectoral GDP we use data from the U.N. National Accounts, which give the 
                                                 
19 The Annex lists the growth spells.   13
share of GDP by sector. Data on population come from the U.N. population division and 
data on poverty come from the World Bank Poverty Database. Finally, data on 
employment come from the ILO-KILM database.  
 
U.N. data on National Accounts has value added disaggregated into seven sectors (ISCS-
revision 3 definitions): agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; mining and utilities; 
manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail, restaurant and hotels; transport, storage 
and communications; and other activities. Poverty data from the World Bank in 
PovCalNet lists several measures of poverty, several measures of income distribution and 
mean survey income. These data are based on household surveys and measure welfare 
either by income or by consumption. The KILM database has information for 20 
indicators of the labor market, with several disaggregations for each. It is the most 
comprehensive database for labor market outcomes available.  However, it has some 
limitations for comparability across countries and within countries across time. The main 
difficulty for cross-country comparability is that definitions vary by country, and the 
coverage of population and of segments of the labor market are not always the same. In 
particular, many countries report values for formal employment only, and others leave 
out sectors such as agriculture.  However, the KILM database does provide information 
when this is the case, so that it is possible to control for differences in measurement and 
coverage. The main problem for within country comparisons is changes in sample or 
survey design. Again, the database provides information on these breaks in the series. In 
addition, the coverage for Sub-Saharan Africa is low.  We use indicators on employment 
by sector. The database presents data for ISCS revision 2 and revision 3. Whenever 
revision 3 is available for a country year, we use this last classification system; otherwise, 
we use the available information using revision 2. In either case we make sectoral 
aggregations consistent with the sectoral aggregation of the U.N. National Accounts 
information on GDP by sector of economic activity. We also include data on employment 
for three other African countries based on country studies that use household data in an 
effort to increase the sample of African countries.
20 
 
To profile growth in terms of employment and productivity by sectors, we construct short 
run “growth spells.”  For each country, short run growth spells are constructed as the 
percentage change in value added per capita (VA) between two consecutive comparable 
points in time. One country may have several growth spells. For each growth spell in VA, 
the corresponding changes (for the exact same years) in employment to labor force ratios 
(E/A) by sectors, value added per worker (Y/E) by sectors, and ratio of labor force to 
total population (A/N) are constructed. To link the profile of growth to poverty, the 
corresponding changes in the poverty headcount ratio are constructed. Care is taken to 
ensure that the spells are comparable in time by taking into consideration that within a 
spell measured poverty is constructed using the same welfare indicator (income or 
consumption) and employment numbers have the same coverage. Consistency in 
employment measures by sectors is obtained by taking into account breaks in 
employment series emanating from changes in either coverage or sample, so that within a 
                                                 
20 These countries are Senegal, with the source World Bank (2007a); Ghana, with the source World Bank (2007b); and 
Madagascar, with the source World Bank (2007c). Ghana and Madagascar drop from the sectoral regression to outlier 
observations.   14
spell, employment is measured using the same sample and coverage. The average 
duration of the short run spells is 2.2 years with the longest spell being 8 years.  
 
Table 1 describes the covered sample. There are few low income countries in the sample, 
and a low number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle East and North 
Africa category.  The main data limitations come from the employment data, which have 
very low coverage in these regions. This implies that the analysis may better describe the 
behavior of middle income countries.  Nevertheless, we are able to capture 15 percent of 
all low income countries.   
 
Table 1: Sample Description 
Countries Grouped by Region 










By Region          
Sub-Saharan Africa  48 4 8.3% 
East Asia and the Pacific  24 5 20.8% 
Europe and Central Asia  27 9 33.3% 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 31 17 54.8% 
Middle East and North Africa  14 1 7.1% 
South Asia  8 3 37.5% 
Total  152 39 24.3% 
           
By Income Level          
Low Income  53 8 15.0% 
Lower Middle Income  58 20 34.5% 
Upper Middle Income  41 11 26.8% 
Total  152 39 24.3% 
 
3  Results:  What Do the Stylized Facts Say? 
 
Figure 1 presents stylized facts on the empirical link between growth and changes in 
poverty in all countries for which data were available. The first row of plots shows how 
poverty changes are correlated with changes in productivity, employment rates and the 
share of the population of working age. The second row of plots illustrates how per capita 
value added growth in that country is correlated with the same three variables. Each data 
point in the figure corresponds to a specific growth spell in a country. Productivity is 
defined as value added per worker. Employment rates are measured as the employed as a 
fraction of the working age population. The share of the population of working age is the 
ratio of the working age population to the total population. A growth spell is simply the 
percentage change in the variables of interest between two points in time. The spells are 
short and medium run:  on average, each spell lasts two years, and most spells are 
between one and four years. The first row of plots in Figure 1 illustrates the correlation 
between  per capita value added and percentage changes in productivity (first plot), 
employment rates (second plot) and the inverse of the dependency rate (third plot). The   15
strong positive correlation between changes in productivity and per capita value added 
stands out, meaning that productivity growth and per capita value added growth are 
strongly correlated. Changes in employment as well in as the share of the population of 
working age are also positively correlated with increases in per capita value added, but 
their confidence intervals are substantially wider, suggesting that the relation is less 
strong.  The second row of plots in the figure illustrates how percentage changes in 
headcount poverty correlate with the same three components. All of these components 
appear to be negatively correlated with poverty, although the correlations appear to be 
small and the confidence intervals (the shaded area) large. The positive correlation is 
perhaps not surprising: higher value added per worker can translate into higher labor 
income either through higher wages or through higher profits from self-employment, and 
thus it can alleviate poverty. Higher employment rates would imply more people working 
and thus more people earning. Lower dependency rates mean that each working age 
member has fewer people to support on his/her income.  
 
Figure 1:  Empirical Link between the Components of per Capita GDP, Growth and Changes in 
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Figure 2:  Correlation of Changes in Poverty and in Value Added per Capita with Changes in Output 
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Figure 3:  Correlation of Changes in Poverty and in Value Added per Capita with Employment 
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Figure 2 illustrates how changes in poverty and value added per capita are correlated with 
changes in productivity (value added per worker) for three selected sectors (agriculture, 
manufacturing and services).  Again, each data point corresponds to an observed country 
growth spell. A simple look at the figure suggests that there may be important 
differences. For example, growth in output per worker in agriculture and services appears 
strongly correlated with poverty alleviation, while productivity growth in manufacturing 
does not seem to have a clear effect on poverty (first row of plots). On the other hand, 
changes in productivity in all sectors seem to be positively associated with aggregate 
growth, with no significant differences among sectors. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how changes in poverty and changes in per capita value added are 
correlated with employment growth in the selected sectors. There are clear differences 
among sectors. Employment growth in agriculture is associated with growing poverty, 
but employment growth in manufacturing and services seems to be associated with 
decreases in poverty. In other words, within countries, employment growth in agriculture 
as a share of working age population coincides with rises in poverty. It is worth 
highlighting that these are changes within two years (on average), so that the observed 
changes are not long run structural changes.  The relationship between changes in overall 
per capita value added and employment rates in the different sectors also differ.   
Increases in employment in agriculture appear negatively correlated with overall growth, 
while the opposite holds true for manufacturing and construction. This behavior suggests 
important productivity differences between agriculture and non-agriculture. 
4  Results:  Growth and Poverty  
4.1  Not All Growth Is Equal for Poverty Changes  
 
We proceed to analyze whether growth patterns matter for poverty changes. We first 
analyze the relationship between poverty changes and the aggregate 
employment/productivity profile of growth by estimating Equation 3. We then proceed to 
estimate the relationship between poverty reduction and the sectoral pattern of growth 
(Equation 4). Finally, we analyze whether the sectoral employment and productivity 
profile matters for poverty reduction by estimating Equation 5. For each equation we 
estimate several models. Model (1) is the benchmark estimation, with no controls. In 
Model (2) we control for changes in inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient of 
mean survey income.  We do so because inequality may affect poverty and the growth 
pattern.
  21  Models (3) to (6) check whether the results hold for different sub-samples: 
non upper middle income countries, non Latin American and the Caribbean countries, 
and positive and negative growth spells. All errors are clustered by country and outliers 
excluded from the sample. Our dependent variable is the headcount poverty ratio.
22 
 
                                                 
21 That poverty is correlated with changes in distribution is well known (see Bourguignon 2002).  Inequality may also 
affect the pattern of growth.  Specifically, higher levels of inequality may promote pro-capital or pro-labor policies or 
anti-agricultural bias (see Loayza and Raddatz, 2006).  Initial levels of inequality and initial levels mean income, as 
well as the interaction of both, where also included but where never significant. 
22 For our sample, changes in poverty depth are strongly correlated with changes in headcount poverty, so we have 
limited ourselves to only one poverty measure.   18
Before estimating whether the growth pattern is correlated with poverty reduction, we 
checked whether aggregate growth in per capita value added is correlated with poverty 
reduction. In all models, except for non upper middle income countries, we find that 
growth explains poverty reduction. For upper middle income countries, only changes in 
inequality affect growth. It is also interesting to note that in negative growth episodes 
both aggregate growth and changes in distribution have a reduced power in explaining 
poverty changes, but their coefficients are significantly larger than in periods of positive 
growth. This result highlights possible asymmetries in the way poverty and per capita 
value added growth are related. Table 2 shows the results. 
 
 
Table 2: Percent Change in Headcount Ratio and Aggregate Growth  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Benchmark  Controls 
Non Upper 
Middle 





Change in Y/N 
(%) -3.616***  -3.650***  -1.479 -4.848***  -3.280***  -9.604* 
 (-3.95)  (-4.19)  (-1.69)  (-3.39)  (-3.87)  (-1.90) 
            
Change in Gini 
(%)   2.562***  1.565***  2.375***  1.729***  5.081* 
   (2.82)  (3.94)  (3.03)  (3.33)  (2.03) 
            
Constant 0.151*  0.158*  0.00409  0.310*  0.130  -0.0687 
 (1.79)  (1.92)  (0.06)  (1.75)  (1.41)  (-0.28) 
            
Observations 104  104  63  41  73  31 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.139  0.241  0.142  0.283  0.215  0.177 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation 3.  Both the aggregate productivity 
intensity of growth and the aggregate employment intensity are negatively correlated 
with poverty changes, with employment having a slightly smaller significance level. In 
periods of negative growth, however, only employment changes seem to matter. A test 
for the equality of the coefficients cannot be rejected in any of the models estimated. 
Therefore, it appears that the impact of productivity-intensive growth is not different 
from employment-intensive growth. If anything, we can conclude that it is productivity-
intensive growth that is more robustly correlated with poverty reduction, with the 
possible exception being during recessions. 
 
To estimate whether growth patterns may matter for poverty alleviation we estimate Equation 4 
using a three sector disaggregation (primary, secondary and tertiary) and a seven sector 
disaggregation (agriculture, mining and utilities, manufacturing, construction, commerce, 
services, and transport and communications). The results suggest that only the secondary and 
tertiary sectors and their sub-sectors have any impact on poverty. However, neither in the three 
sector disaggregation nor in the seven sector case could we reject equality of coefficients across   19
sectors and sub-sectors. This suggests that the sectoral pattern of growth does not matter for 
poverty (that is, whether growth is concentrated in the primary, secondary or tertiary sector is 
unrelated to poverty changes). Table 4 shows the estimation results for the three sector case. 
 
Table 3: Poverty Changes and the Employment/Productivity Intensity of Growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 










Inverse of dependency 
A/N   -2.895  -2.287  1.709  -8.124  1.395  -37.11 
 (-0.59)  (-0.48)  (0.24)  (-1.29)  (0.29)  (-1.70) 
            
Value added per 
worker Y/E  -3.612***  -3.686***  -1.762 -4.391**  -3.828***  -8.137 
 (-3.95)  (-4.26)  (-1.24)  (-2.76)  (-3.35)  (-1.55) 
            
Employment rate E/A  -4.604**  -4.783**  -0.690  -6.905**  -3.413**  -14.48** 
 (-2.59)  (-2.64)  (-0.37)  (-2.36)  (-2.47)  (-2.34) 
            
Change in Gini (%)    2.586***  1.543***  2.341***  1.719***  4.217 
   (2.84)  (3.59)  (3.26)  (3.42)  (1.33) 
            
Constant 0.144  0.146  -0.0263  0.302*  0.102  0.205 
 (1.37)  (1.45)  (-0.25)  (1.76)  (1.04)  (0.53) 
            
Observations 104  104  63  41  73  31 
Adjusted R-squared  0.127  0.233  0.128  0.270  0.207  0.192 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
We now turn to the sectoral employment intensity of growth by estimating Equation 5.  
As mentioned previously,  s e  reflects how much of the observed aggregate growth can be 
linked to increases in employment in sector s, and   s ω  corresponds to the amount of 
growth that can be linked to changes in productivity in sector s. Again we perform the 
estimation for seven and three sector disaggregations. We cannot reject equality of 
coefficients across sub-sectors in the seven sector case, so we only report the estimation 
for the three sector disaggregation. Table 5 illustrates the results. Employment-intensive 
growth in the secondary sector is negatively and robustly correlated with poverty 
reduction, except in recessions. Employment-intensive growth in agriculture is correlated 
with increases in poverty, except in recessions and in non LAC countries. Even so, the 
coefficient is significant only in non upper middle income countries. Employment-
intensive growth in the tertiary sector is negatively correlated with poverty reduction for 
the upper middle income countries, and positively correlated (though not significantly) in 
the poorest countries. Productivity-intensive growth, however, does not seem to be 
robustly correlated with poverty reduction.  
 
   20
 
Table 4: Poverty Changes and the Sectoral Growth Pattern 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Benchmark  Controls 
Non Upper 
Middle 






Sector) -4.875  -3.813  0.892  -4.891  -3.414  -9.645 
 (-1.17)  (-1.00)  (0.46)  (-0.70)  (-0.88)  (-0.71) 
            
Secondary Sector  -3.876***  -3.207** -1.658  -3.493  -2.771**  -5.038 
 (-3.22)  (-2.71)  (-0.96)  (-1.74)  (-2.21)  (-1.11) 
            
Tertiary Sector  -2.532**  -3.519***  -1.514 -6.144***  -4.118***  -4.281 
 (-2.61)  (-3.96)  (-1.31)  (-3.49)  (-3.31)  (-0.91) 
            
Change in Gini (%)    2.873***  1.803***  2.829***  2.040***  4.747* 
   (2.91)  (4.19)  (3.01)  (3.54)  (1.92) 
            
Constant 0.0706  0.102  -0.0117  0.258  0.111  0.0144 
 (1.04)  (1.50)  (-0.17)  (1.43)  (1.25)  (0.05) 
            
Observations 98 98 58  37  68  30 
Adjusted R-squared  0.094  0.224  0.155  0.246  0.226  0.076 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Several considerations are worth highlighting. First, there appears to be a difference in 
behavior between the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) Countries and the non 
LAC countries. Although in the LAC countries agriculture and services appear to be 
equated with a bad jobs sector, this is not so clear in the non LAC countries. Also, in the 
non LAC countries the secondary sector is significantly correlated with poverty 
reduction, while in the non LAC countries this is not so clear, which suggests that 
services in the LAC countries may be a much more heterogeneous sector, combining 
good and bad jobs.  
 
Our measures of employment-intensive and productivity-intensive growth are negatively 
correlated, within sectors. Although this is to be expected because of decreasing marginal 
productivity and the fact that new entrants into the labor market are younger and so “less 
productive,” the magnitude of the correlation is particular high for the agricultural sector 
(see Annex). A possible explanation is that in the short run the measurement of output is 
less accurate than the measurement of employment—a factor that can be particularly 
important in the case agriculture and services because of the implicit difficulty in 
measuring non-marketable output.  By including productivity and employment jointly we 
might be unable to disentangle the sectoral effects. We explore this issue by regressing 
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Table 5: Poverty Changes and Sectoral Employment/Productivity Intensity  
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Employment-intensive growth in 
Agriculture (Primary Sector)  2.003  3.393  8.155***  -0.428  4.780  -19.75 
  (0.37)  (0.68) (3.30) (-0.04)  (1.41) (-0.85) 
         
Employment-intensive growth in 
Secondary Sector  -6.578***  -5.487*** -4.898*** -5.987*** -4.845*** 0.554 
  (-4.60)  (-3.89) (-2.87) (-3.16) (-4.78) (0.07) 
         
Employment-intensive growth in 
Tertiary Sector  -2.887  -4.529*  0.721  -7.414*  -2.250  -24.88 
  (-1.17)  (-1.87) (0.31)  (-2.02) (-1.53) (-1.68) 
         
Productivity-intensive Growth in 
Agriculture  (Primary  Sector) -4.504  -3.344 0.292  -5.345 -3.325 -12.88 
  (-1.17)  (-0.95) (0.16)  (-0.81) (-1.15) (-1.04) 
         
Productivity-intensive Growth in 
Secondary Sector  -1.753  -1.287 1.254 1.507 1.523 -5.187 
  (-1.16)  (-1.00) (0.81) (0.43) (1.09) (-1.05) 
         
Productivity-intensive Growth in 
Tertiary  Sector  -0.621  -1.651 0.219  -2.843 -1.804 -5.394 
  (-0.52)  (-1.62) (0.18)  (-1.44) (-1.29) (-0.89) 
         
Change  in  Gini  (%)    2.893*** 1.693*** 2.869*** 2.211*** 4.030 
    (3.24) (4.15) (5.05) (4.98) (1.38) 
         
Constant 0.0778  0.121  -0.0303  0.173  0.0400  0.232 
  (1.10)  (1.66) (-0.46)  (1.06) (0.58) (0.73) 
Observations  98  98 58 37 68 30 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.140  0.275 0.342 0.311 0.420 0.134 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
The main difference in the results is that productivity-intensive growth in agriculture is 
robustly correlated with poverty reduction and employment-intensive growth in 
agriculture is robustly correlated with poverty increases. It is therefore difficult to 
determine whether they are capturing different phenomena or the same phenomena.  An 
alternative explanation is related to traditional sector dualism, where output in agriculture 
is fixed and earnings in this sector are equal to average output per worker and therefore 
more workers means less mean output and thus lower earnings. Therefore, employment-
intensive growth in agriculture would be equivalent to the negative of productivity-
intensive growth in the sector, and productivity growth in agriculture might be reflecting 
outflows of workers from agriculture. The positive correlation between poverty and 
increases in employment in agriculture might also be a response to urban crises in which 
poverty increases and therefore workers seek agricultural employment as a safety net, in   22
which case reverse causality might be operating. This would imply that employment in 
urban sectors such as manufacturing would be negatively correlated with agricultural 
employment.  However, this is not the case in the observed sample: employment changes 
in manufacturing are positively correlated with employment changes in agriculture (see 
Annex), which suggests that an exogenous force is pulling employment in both sectors at 
the same time. 
 
Table 6: Poverty Changes and the Sectoral Employment Intensity of Growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 










Growth in Agriculture  8.014*** 8.900***  7.310***  6.467*  8.859***  0.224 
 (3.32)  (4.01)  (4.45)  (1.95)  (4.31)  (0.02) 
            
Employment-intensive 
Growth in Secondary Sector  -6.141***  -5.705***  -5.398*** 
-
159*** -5.999***  2.784 
 (-4.86)  (-4.48)  (-3.53)  (-4.41)  (-5.34)  (0.54) 
            
Employment-intensive 
Growth in Tertiary Sector  -2.404 -3.111  0.450  -5.324*  -0.863  -18.76 
 (-1.28)  (-1.60)  (0.21)  (-1.84)  (-0.62)  (-1.58) 
            
Change in Gini (%)    2.848***  1.661***  2.702***  2.179***  3.152 
   (3.31)  (4.47)  (4.10)  (4.52)  (1.15) 
            
Constant 0.0693  0.0966  -0.0217  0.120  0.0107  0.463* 
 (1.05)  (1.44)  (-0.31)  (1.16)  (0.19)  (2.13) 
            
Observations 98  98  58  37  68  30 
Adjusted R-squared  0.143  0.276  0.370  0.333  0.415  0.182 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
In summary, we find that aggregate employment and productivity-intensive growth are 
clearly associated with poverty, but the evidence suggests that their effects are equivalent. 
A similar result holds for the sectoral pattern of growth. What seems to matter most is the 
employment and productivity sectoral profile of growth. We find that employment-
intensive growth in agriculture is correlated with rising poverty while employment-
intensive growth in the secondary is correlated with reductions in poverty. On the other 
hand, productivity-intensive growth in agriculture is correlated with poverty reductions 
while productivity-intensive growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors has an 
ambiguous relation with poverty. The effects of the agricultural profile of growth are 
difficult to disentangle. The evidence also shows that there is some heterogeneity among 
countries, with upper middle income countries showing a different behavior from the rest. 
The correlation between growth profiles and poverty reduction also shows asymmetries 
between positive and negative growth spells, although our sample of negative growth 
spells is rather small. 
   23
The size of these effects is important: a 1 percent employment-intensive growth in 
agriculture raises the headcount poverty by around 6.5 percent (the headcount poverty 
goes from 45 percent to 48 percent) to 9 percent. A 1 percent employment-intensive 
growth in manufacturing decreases  poverty by 5 percent to 7 percent.  Productivity-
intensive growth in agriculture reduces poverty by 4 percent to 9 percent. 
 
Table 7: Poverty Changes and the Sectoral Productivity Intensity of Growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 









Productivity-intensive Growth in 
Agriculture   -7.227*** -7.131***  -4.141**  -9.452** 
-
7.112***  -9.590 
 (-3.00)  (-3.45)  (-2.78)  (-2.64)  (-3.88)  (-0.88) 
            
Productivity-intensive Growth in 
Secondary Sector  0.596  0.813  3.398*  3.624  5.081**  1.328 
 (0.33)  (0.53)  (1.82)  (0.90)  (2.69)  (0.34) 
            
Productivity-intensive Growth in 
Tertiary Sector  -0.726 -1.149  -1.156  -0.643  -1.324  4.769 
 (-0.72)  (-1.17)  (-1.04)  (-0.29)  (-0.97)  (0.68) 
            
Change in Gini (%)    2.810***  1.887***  2.783***  2.003***  3.094 
   (3.34)  (4.50)  (3.99)  (3.67)  (0.99) 
            
Constant 0.0277  0.0412  -0.0493  0.0458  -0.0894  0.340 
 (0.43)  (0.64)  (-0.88)  (0.31)  (-1.36)  (1.21) 
            
Observations 98  98  58  37  68  30 
Adjusted R-squared  0.045  0.174  0.232  0.185  0.317  0.072 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
4.2  The Determinants of Growth Patterns 
 
In the previous section we found that there are important differences between countries in 
the type of growth experienced, and that these differences may be significant for the 
poverty impact of growth. It is thus important to find out whether the observed growth 
patterns are the result of the underlying labor market characteristics.  
 
In this section we explore the determinants of manufacturing and secondary sector labor-
intensive growth and agricultural productivity-intensive growth. In particular, we explore 
whether education, the share of workers in agriculture, labor market regulation, trade and 
some investment climate indicators are correlated with poverty reduction. To do this, we 
regress our measures of employment and productivity-intensive growth against the value 
of the variable at the beginning of the period (see Equation 6). The dependent variable is 
measured in percentage points of growth. The independent variables are measured in 
levels at the beginning of the spell. By using the level of the variable at the beginning of   24
the spell rather than the change, we hope to be able to better assess causality. We focus 
on labor-intensive growth in the manufacturing and secondary sectors and on agricultural 
productivity-intensive growth, since our previous findings suggest that these are the 
growth patterns that are positively correlated with poverty reduction.
  We thus test 
whether these growth patterns can be explained by the selected variables.   
4.2.1  Regulation and Unionization 
 
There is a vast literature that analyzes the effect of regulation on employment or on the 
unemployment rate (for reviews see Heckman and Pages, 2003; Arias et al. 2005; among 
others). Most of this literature concludes that labor regulation hinders employment 
creation and raises unemployment and that the impact of labor regulation on productivity 
growth has been underemphasized. Another strand of literature analyzes the effect of 
regulation on growth or on poverty. Lustig and McLeod (1997), for example, analyze the 
impact of minimum wages on poverty in developing countries, while Besley and Burgess 
(2004) find that pro-poor worker regulation is associated with lower output growth and 
higher urban poverty in India. The study on “Pro-Poor Growth in the 1990’s” (World 
Bank, 2005), find that highly regulated labor markets limit the poor from participating in 
economic growth. The focus of these studies has been aggregate employment or 
productivity growth rather than the employment/productivity intensity of growth, and few 
of these studies consider sectoral differences. Moreover, factors other than labor 
regulation have received little attention. The exception is perhaps a paper by Revenga and 
Bentolila (1995), who find that for OECD countries the employment intensity of growth 
is affected by the share of agriculture in total output, firing costs, inter-union and inter-
firm coordination and the percentage of employees in large firms.   
 
To measure labor regulation we use two sets of variables:  (i) those on hiring restrictions 
and labor costs, and (ii) those on unionization and strikes. The first group includes the 
monthly minimum wage in absolute value (U.S. dollars) and the minimum wage relative 
to the average manufacturing wage; the duration of maternity leave; the minimum annual 
paid leave after one year of work; the social security contributions paid by the worker and 
the employers as a fraction of salaries; and the severance pay after three years of 
employment in months of salary. As for unionization, we explored the effect of trade 
union membership as a percent of the labor force, the coverage of collective agreements 
as a percent of salaried employment, the number of strikes and lockouts per year, annual 
work days lost to strikes, and the number of workers involved in strikes and lockouts. We 
use data on labor regulation compiled by Rama and Artecona (2002) and Sulla, Scarpetta 
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0.000295***   0.000129***  
  (-3.22)   (-3.02)   (3.92)   
          
Minimum Wage 
Relative to Average   -0.0497**       
   (-2.31)       
          
Paid  Annual  Leave         0.000552** 
         ( 2 . 8 9 )  
          
Severance  Payment      0.0103**    
      ( 3 . 0 8 )     
          
Constant  0.0198** 0.0178**  0.0310** -0.0380**  -0.0215***  -0.0165** 
  (2.83) (2.84)  (2.50) (-3.46)  (-4.48)  (-2.84) 
          
Observations  42 31  42 17  42 15 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.201 0.155  0.158 0.059  0.182 0.099 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Table 8 shows the results of those variables that were significantly correlated with the 
sectoral employment and productivity profile of growth.
23  The results suggest that 
employment-intensive growth in manufacturing is affected by minimum wages (both in 
absolute terms and relative to the average manufacturing wage) having a negative effect. 
Minimum wages also reduce secondary sector employment-intensive growth, while 
severance appears to have a positive effect. This last result is somewhat surprising. A 
possible explanation is that it may raise the supply of labor to this sector, or may reduce 
turnover during recessions.  No other regulation variables considered had any explanatory 
power. Labor costs also appear to affect productivity-intensive growth in agriculture, 
although the signs of the coefficients are not straightforward to interpret. Minimum 
wages are significant in explaining agricultural productivity-intensive growth with a 
positive coefficient. A possible interpretation is that minimum wages and paid annual 
leave are binding mostly for non-agricultural firms, and thus higher minimum wages and 
better employment benefits make employment in the urban sector more attractive, so that 
workers are more willing to queue for an urban good job. This outflow from agriculture 
(into unemployment and bad jobs) raises output per worker in agriculture.  
 
None of the unionization variables appear significant in explaining employment-intensive 
growth in manufacturing or the secondary sector. Instead, agricultural productivity 
growth is affected positively by strikes and lockouts, the number of workers participating 
                                                 
23 Non-significant results are not reported for brevity.    26
in them, and the number of days lost as a result, although the size of the coefficient is 
small and has a low confidence level (5 percent) (results are not shown for brevity). The 
results of the impact of labor regulation on the pattern of growth which are presented here 
should be taken with reservation, as the sample size is very small. 
4.2.2  Education and the Structure of Employment  
Education has always been given a prominent role in explaining growth, and it seems 
intuitive that the availability of skills may determine the growth pattern. Education levels 
may affect employment-intensive growth by supplying (or not supplying) the skills 
required by the growth process. For example, low education levels may imply a supply of 
cheap labor. But, on the other hand, if education levels are too low compared to the levels 
needed by the process of industrialization (for example, if there is a large fraction of 
illiterate), employment growth in manufacturing may be hampered. On the other hand, in 
the dualist models of the labor market it has often been stressed that the size of the 
“residual” employment sector may affect growth in the “modern” sector of the economy 
by providing more “surplus labor” to feed into employment-intensive growth at a given 
wage. In this section we explore whether the initial level of education or the share of 
workers employed in agriculture are correlated with our measures of employment-
intensive growth in manufacturing and the secondary sector and of productivity-intensive 
growth in agriculture. In particular, we look at the effect of the share of population with 
no schooling, the average level of education of the population age 25 and older, and the 
share of employment in the primary sector.  
 
None of the variables explains manufacturing employment-intensive growth, while only 
the share of workers in agriculture explains employment-intensive growth in the 
secondary sector (Table 9). When analyzing the effect of education and the structure of 
the labor force on agricultural productivity-intensive growth, we find that no schooling is 
negatively and robustly correlated, while average schooling is positively and robustly 
correlated. In other words, education is important in fostering productivity growth in 
agriculture and thus alleviating poverty. 
 
The lack of significance of the education variables in explaining employment-intensive 
growth in manufacturing and the secondary sector may respond to several factors. One 
possible explanation is that education may have ambiguous effects on fostering 
employment-intensive growth. On one hand, it may mean that low levels of education 
may signify cheap labor to feed into employment-intensive growth, but on the other hand, 
it means that the low skills and low productivity of the labor force may be a disincentive 
to labor demand. Both effects may cancel one another. On the other hand, a high initial 
share of workers in agriculture, may foster employment-intensive growth in the 
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Share of Workers in Agriculture 0.0933**       
 (2.48)       
        
Share of Population with No 
Schooling     -0.000278**   
     (-2.60)   
        
Average   -0.00275*    0.00187* 
   (-1.80)    (1.97) 
        
Constant -0.0178***  0.0102  0.00164  -0.0145** 
 (-3.17)  (1.19)  (0.77)  (-2.38) 
        
Observations 105  88  88  88 
Adjusted R-squared  0.091  0.009  0.074  0.034 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
4.2.3  Trade, the Regulatory Environment and the Investment Climate 
 
Recent research into the determinants of growth has concentrated on “investment climate 
indicators” “competitiveness” and trade (see Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Dollar et al., 2003; 
and Kaufman et al., 1999). The general idea is that a poorly operating regulatory 
environment, corruption, excessive red tape, poor protection of property rights, 
macroeconomic instability and uncertainty and poor governance diminish returns to 
investment and thus hamper growth. Equally important has been the role of trade in 
promoting broad-based growth, as trade can affect markets for land and labor, which are 
the most abundant factors among the poor, as well as the prices of products produced by 
the poor (see Winters, 2000). In this section we extend this literature by analyzing 
whether the investment climate, the regulatory environment, and openness to trade affect 
the growth pattern. 
 
The above-mentioned literature has benefited from recent efforts at collecting data to 
assess governance and the investment climate. Governance indicators have been collected 
by the World Bank since 1996, and investment climate indicators have been available 
since 2002. Unfortunately, few data points match our growth spells, and therefore we 
were unable to make use of this recent high quality data. However, the Heritage 
Foundation has been collecting data on “economic freedoms” since 1995 for a wide 
number of countries. Most of the measures are aimed at capturing government 
intervention in the business environment. The data contain measures for 10 economic 
freedoms and an overall score. Each index goes from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the   28
least government intervention or regulatory burden.
24  We regress our measures of 
employment-intensive growth in manufacturing and the secondary sector and of 
agricultural productivity-intensive growth against the overall score and the 10 indexes. 
Table 10 presents the results. 
 
Most of the results are contrary to what could be expected. The overall score is 
significant only for employment-intensive growth in the secondary sector, with more 
“freedom” being damaging for employment growth. Business regulation affects mostly 
productivity-intensive growth in agriculture, with a negative effect. The results suggest 
that openness to trade as measured by import and export taxes limits employment-
intensive growth in the secondary sector and in manufacturing. Macroeconomic stability 
and lack of price controls appear to promote employment-intensive growth in 
manufacturing but to hamper productivity growth in agriculture. Financial freedom is 
harmful to employment-intensive growth in manufacturing and the secondary sector, and 
the index of property rights is negatively correlated with agricultural productivity growth. 
Therefore, aside from monetary stability, the effects of a lower regulatory burden are 
contrary to the general wisdom, as they do not reduce poverty. The same results hold if 
each of these variables is regressed separately (rather than jointly) on our measures of 
employment and productivity growth. 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned variables we use a more traditional measure of trade: 
the share of imports and exports in value added (openness). We also asses whether the 
situation of being landlocked, foreign direct investment, the terms of trade or the real 
effective exchange rate affect the growth pattern.
25  The measures come from Sinnott and 











                                                 
24 The 10 freedoms measured are the following: Business Freedom measures the costs and the time it takes 
to open and close a business; the Trade Freedom index measures taxes on imports and exports; Fiscal 
Freedom measures the tax burden on individuals and corporations and as a percent of GDP; Freedom from 
Government measures expenditures as a percent of GDP and revenue from state-owned enterprises; 
Monetary Freedom measures price stability and price controls;  Investment Freedom measures the 
regulatory bias against foreign direct investment; Financial Freedom measures government intervention in 
the financial system, including ownership and regulation;  Property Freedom measures the ability and 
guaranties to accumulate private property; the Freedom from Corruption index measures the perception of 
government corruption; and Labor Freedom measures hiring and firing restrictions as well as non-wage 
labor costs (only available since 2007). 
25 Terms of trade are measured as the price index of exports over the price index of imports; the real 
effective exchange rate index accounts for the existence of distortions between the tradable and non-
tradable sector and is defined at the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency 
against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs.     29
 





Growth in Secondary Sector  
Productivity-intensive 
Growth in Agriculture 
Overall Score  -0.000333    -0.00117*    0.000113   
 (-1.27)    (-2.00)    (0.54)   
            
Business Regulation    -0.000124    0.000207    0.000652** 
   (-0.85)    (0.38)    (2.13) 
            
Trade   -0.000447**    -0.000731*    0.000329 
   (-2.09)    (-1.72)    (1.59) 
            
Fiscal   0.0000855    -0.000591    0.000112 
   (0.24)    (-0.89)    (0.38) 
            
Government   0.0000945    0.000357    0.0000921 
   (0.63)    (1.40)    (0.61) 
            
Monetary   0.000177***   0.000191    -0.000129* 
   (3.34)    (1.45)    (-1.89) 
            
Investment   0.0000443    -0.000105    0.000218 
   (0.22)    (-0.28)    (0.93) 
            
Financial   -0.000247*    -0.000559**    -0.000213 
   (-1.78)    (-2.23)    (-1.36) 
            
Property Rights    0.000000891    -0.000671    -0.000587** 
   (0.00)    (-1.57)    (-2.63) 
            
Corruption   -0.0000427    0.000182    0.0000411 
   (-0.42)    (1.22)    (0.52) 
            
Constant 0.0155  0.0175  0.0608*  0.104*  -0.00914  -0.0347 
 (0.99)  (0.51)  (1.73)  (1.99)  (-0.71)  (-1.36) 
            
Observations 67  67  67  67  67  67 
Adjusted R-squared  0.017  0.093  0.092  0.251  -0.011  0.102 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Table 11 shows the results for the employment intensity of growth in the manufacturing 
sector and in the secondary sector, as well as the productivity-intensive growth in 
agriculture. Given that the variables are likely to be correlated (e.g., being landlocked 
limits trade, as does an appreciated exchange rate), and therefore that it might not be 
possible to identify the effects in a joint regression, each variable was tested on its own 
and jointly. The evidence suggests that openness to trade is positively correlated with 
employment-intensive growth in manufacturing and the secondary sector, as is favorable 
terms of trade (the price of exports relative to the price of imports). As would be 
expected, overvalued exchange rate decreases employment-intensive growth, by making   30
exports less competitive and making capital (which is mostly imported in developing 
countries) cheaper relative to labor. The only variable that seems to affect agricultural 
productivity-intensive growth is terms of trade, with better terms of trade decreasing such 
productivity. It is not easy to speculate which is the mechanism at work in this case. A 
possible explanation is that the terms of trade are capturing a larger share of 
manufacturing exports, so that the higher profitability of manufacturing in relative terms 
may be a disincentive to agricultural investment. It is worth pointing out that the signs of 
the coefficients in the regression for employment-intensive growth are opposite to those 
for agricultural productivity-intensive growth, which suggests that in the short run trade 
policy might entail important trade-offs for this front. Finally, being landlocked reduces 
employment-intensive growth in manufacturing and the secondary sector and reduces 
agricultural productivity-intensive growth, although the coefficient is significant only in 
the joint regression, which covers a smaller sample.   31
Table 11:  Trade and the Employment Intensity of Growth in Manufacturing and the Secondary Sector 
 
 
  Employment-intensive Growth in Manufacturing  Employment-intensive Growth in the Secondary Sector 
Openness to 
Trade 0.0137***          0.00491  0.0208**          0.0169 
 (2.99)        (0.32)  (2.58)          (0.79) 
                       
Terms of 
Trade    0.000799***       0.000511   0.000905       0.00129 
    (3.38)       (0.70)   (1.35)       (1.01) 




Rate      -0.000474**     -0.000205    
-
0.00153**     -0.000827 
      (-2.98)     (-0.47)     (-2.38)      (-0.77) 
                       
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment        0.000875   0.000180       -0.00255   0.00257 
        (0.76)   (0.10)       (-0.89)    (0.56) 
                       
Landlocked         -0.00223  0.00963          -0.0353 -0.106*** 
      (-0.24)  (0.73)          (-1.32)  (-4.98) 
                       
Constant -0.00946***  -0.0843***  0.0444** -0.00828*  -0.00509*  -0.0419 
-
0.0175***  -0.101 0.146*  0.00102  -0.00738  -0.0669 
  (-3.54)  (-3.63)  (2.50)  (-1.82) (-1.89)  (-0.37) (-3.53)  (-1.54)  (2.13)  (0.10) (-1.55)  (-0.30) 
                       
Observations  43  43  19  43 44  16 43  43  19  43  44  16 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.103  0.114  0.078  -0.012 -0.023  -0.215 0.061  0.028 0.211  0.001 0.041  0.396 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses.   32
Table 12: Trade and the Productivity Intensity of Growth 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we analyzed the relationship between poverty and the employment and 
productivity profile of growth, both at the aggregate level and by sectors. We 
decomposed per capita value added growth among labor market components 
(employment, productivity and demographic changes) and empirically analyzed how 
each component affects poverty. We also explored the role of labor market 
characteristics, the structure of employment and the investment climate and trade in the 
observed growth pattern. 
 
We complement the existing literature in several ways. First, we go beyond the sectoral 
pattern of growth or its overall employment intensity and we analyze the role of sectoral 
productivity and employment intensity in poverty alleviation. Second, we use a 
decomposition methodology to construct a measure of employment-intensive growth and 
an analogous measure of productivity-intensive growth. We believe this measure 
addresses some conceptual and empirical weaknesses of the more commonly used 
measure: the employment elasticity of growth. Third, our study includes a larger fraction 
of countries than previous studies. Fourth, we go beyond the correlation between poverty 
and the pattern of growth, and explore the correlation between economic policies and 
outcomes, and the observed growth pattern. 
 
  Agricultural Productivity-intensive Growth 
Openness to Trade  -0.00214          0.000114 
 (-0.77)          (0.01) 
            
Terms of Trade    -0.000453**        -0.0000282 
   (-2.17)        (-0.07) 
            
 Real Effective Exchange 
Rate     0.000245      0.000272 
     (1.11)      (0.66) 
            
Foreign Direct Investment        -0.000296    0.000592 
       (-0.19)    (0.21) 
            
Landlocked         -0.0127  -0.0621*** 
         (-0.69)  (-5.16) 
            
Constant -0.00153  0.0423**  -0.0270  -0.00142  -0.00151  -0.0259 
 (-0.65)  (2.10)  (-1.18)  (-0.26)  (-0.85)  (-0.33) 
            
Observations 43  43  19  43  44  16 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.020  0.035  -0.032  -0.022  0.023  0.357 
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01. T-statistics in parentheses   33
Using a sample of 106 growth spells covering 39 countries, we find that the sectoral 
growth pattern and the employment/productivity profile vary significantly among 
countries. In the aggregate, the employment intensity of growth does not seem to matter 
for poverty any more than the productivity intensity. But the sectoral pattern of 
employment generation and productivity growth is important. The results appear to 
suggest that employment-intensive growth in the secondary sector alleviates poverty. By 
contrast, more employment-intensive growth in agriculture tends to be correlated with 
increases in poverty while productivity-intensive growth in agriculture has a significant 
correlation with poverty reduction, although both measures are highly correlated so that it 
is difficult to asses whether productivity increases in agriculture are different from 
“moving workers out of agriculture.” 
 
Evidence for the link between employment-intensive growth and education, regulation, 
the investment climate and trade is less conclusive, as the available samples are rather 
small. There seems to be no clear correlation between schooling and employment-
intensive growth in manufacturing or the secondary sector as a whole. As far as 
regulation is concerned, only minimum wages (negatively) and severance pay 
(positively) appear to be correlated with employment-intensive growth in manufacturing. 
Unionization does not seem to affect employment-intensive growth in the secondary 
sector or in manufacturing. However, education does seem to be positively correlated 
with agricultural productivity-intensive growth. Volumes of trade, favorable terms of 
trade and an undervalued currency promote employment-intensive growth in 
manufacturing, while a landlocked situation reduces it. Trade has differing impacts on the 
primary and secondary sectors, and thus policy on this front might entail important trade-
offs. 
 
The framework used in this paper is inscribed in the segmented labor markets tradition. 
Although we do not provide a formal model of segmentation that explains the 
mechanisms at work, we provide an intuitive description of the implications of labor 
market segmentation for the poverty/growth linkages. The results appear to support the 
hypothesis of labor market segmentation with good and bad sectors coexisting and 
movements from the latter to the former increasing welfare and reducing poverty. 
Through our assessment of sectors according to economic classification, our results 
suggest that agriculture may be a bad jobs sector, which is consistent with traditional dual 
economy models. However, results also point to heterogeneity between regions as to 
which sectors can be equated to the ‘low earnings sectors’, with non LAC countries 
apparently having an important share of bad jobs in the service sector.  
 
The results imply that focusing on the overall employment elasticity of growth may not 
be an effective way to increase the poverty impact of growth. Therefore, it is important 
for policymakers to move beyond the aggregate figure of growth and its impact on 
employment and to place greater focus on the sectoral distribution of growth and its 
employment and productivity profile. Higher employment will reduce poverty only if it is 
concentrated in the good jobs sectors.  On average, this appears to be the secondary 
sector (manufacturing, construction, mining and utilities). Focusing on the rising 
productivity of agriculture and moving workers out of the agricultural sector will also   34
alleviate poverty. More research into understanding the barriers faced by the poor in 
moving out of agriculture may prove fruitful for policymaking. The results also suggest 
that policies that address educational deficiencies in the rural sector and minimum wage 
regulation in the secondary sector may merit careful consideration. Trade volumes, terms 
of trade and the real effective exchange may deserve special attention in the short run, as 
important agriculture/non-agriculture trade-offs may arise. 
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Formulas used for the Shapley Decomposition 
 
 To decompose changes in per capita value added we used Shapley decompositions. This 
section illustrates in a two sector case the formulas used to calculate the contribution of 
different factors to changes in per capita value added. 
 












( ) 11 22 * yee a ωω =+  
where Y is value added, E is employment, A is the population of working age and N is the 
total population. The ratio ω=Y /E corresponds to output per worker, e=E/A corresponds 
to the share of the working age population employed and a=A/N corresponds to the share 
of the population of working age--that is, the ratio of working age population to total 
population. The sub-index  (1, 2) s∈  stands for the sector of economic activity. Using the 
formula for Shapley values (see Shorrocks 1999, and Muller 2005 for discussion) we 
performed a stepwise Shapley decomposition of Equation A1 as described below. 
 
Step 1: Decomposing changes in per capita value added into demographic and non 
demographic components 
 










Equation A1 can then be written as:  * y za = . Using the Shapley approach, the 
contribution of z to changes in y -denote it by z - can be calculated as:  
 




The first term in round brackets in Equation A2 corresponds to the difference between the 
observed change in y and the change under a hypothetical scenario in which z had 
changed as observed but a had stayed constant and equal to the observed value in t=1. 
The second term in round brackets corresponds to  the difference between the observed 
change in y and the change in y under a hypothetical scenario in which z had changed as 
observed but a had stayed constant, but in this case equal to the observed value in t=2.   40
 
Analogously, the contribution of a to changes in y, denote it by a , would be calculated 
as: 
[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) 22 11 12 11 22 11 22 21 1/2 1/2 tt tt tt tt tt tt tt tt a z az a z az a z az a z az a == == == == == == == == =− − − +− − −  
Letting Δ denote changes between t=2 and t=1, it is easy to see that: 
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Moreover, it is easy to check that az y + =Δ , so that the Shapley decomposition is 
additive. 
 
Step 2: Decomposing the value added per working age person, z, into sectoral 
contributions  
 
In the second step we decompose changes in value added per working age person Y/A=z, 
into the contribution of changes in value added per working person in sector 1 (z1=Y1/A) 
and the contribution of changes in value added per working age person of sector 2 
(z2=Y2/A). In this case, because total sectoral value added per working person is just the 
sum of sectoral value added per working person in both sectors then: 
12
zz z
ss z z and z z z = ΔΔ = + Δ  
Where 
z
s z  denotes the contribution of changes in value added per working age person in 
sector s to the change in aggregate value added per working age person z. The superscript 
z makes it explicit that the contribution is to value added per working age person z, rather 
than to value added per capita y.  
 
Step 3: Decomposing the value added per working age person in sector s, into 
changes in employment and changes in productivity  
 
The next step is to decompose Ys/A=zs. Note that value added per working age person in 






With Es denoting the number of workers in sector s, and Ys denoting value added in sector 
s. Equivalently, the above equation can be written as  * s ss ze ω = , with ωs=Ys/Es and 
es=Es/A. Therefore, as in step 1, we can calculate the contribution of changes in 
employment (
s z
s e ) to changes in value added per working age person in sector s, and also 
the contribution of changes in output per worker 
s z
s ω  to changes in value added per 
working age person in sector s:  
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s ze ω Δ= + . Note again that the superscript makes explicit the fact 
that the corresponding terms denote contributions to zs. 
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Step 4: Calculating the contribution of sectoral changes in productivity and 
employment to changes in per capita value added, y 
 
Once all of the above terms are calculated we proceed to calculate the contribution of 
sectoral value added, and sectoral employment and productivity, to changes in per capita 
value added y (which is our measure of growth). We do so in the following way: 
 











In other words, it is the product of the amount of growth in per capita value that can be 
attributed to changes in value added per working age person, times the fraction of 
changes in value added per working age person that can be attributed to sector s (the lack 
of superscript makes explicit the fact that it is a contribution to growth). 
 
The contribution of employment changes in sector s, to changes in per capita value 












Therefore, it is just the product of the amount of growth in per capita value added that can 
be attributed to sector s, times the share of growth in sector s that can be attributed to 
employment changes in the sector. In a similar way, the contribution of productivity 












These terms, together with the contribution of demographic changes a  calculated in the 
first step, completely profile growth in terms of demographic changes, sectoral growth, 
and sectoral employment and productivity. 
 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1: List of countries and spells 
Country Spell  Region  Income  Level 
Argentina  96-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Argentina  98-01  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Azerbaijan  01-02  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Bangladesh 83-85  South  Asia  Low 
Bolivia  97-99  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  02-03  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  81-84  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  84-85  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  85-87  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  87-89  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  89-90  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  92-93  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  93-95  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle   42
Table A1: List of countries and spells (continued) 
 
Brazil  95-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  96-97  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  97-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  98-99  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Brazil  99-01  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Chile  87-89  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Chile  89-90  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Chile  90-92  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Chile  92-94  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Chile  96-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Chile  98-00  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Colombia  88-89  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Colombia  91-95  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Colombia  95-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Colombia  96-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Colombia  98-99  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Colombia  99-00  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Costa Rica  90-93  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Costa Rica  93-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Costa Rica  96-97  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Costa Rica  97-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Croatia  00-01  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Croatia  98-99  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Croatia  99-00  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Dominican Republic  92-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Ecuador  94-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Egypt  90-95  Middle East & North Africa  Lower middle 
Egypt  95-99  Middle East & North Africa  Lower middle 
El Salvador  96-97  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Georgia  00-01  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Georgia  01-02  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Georgia  02-03  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Georgia  98-99  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Georgia  99-00  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Honduras  96-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Honduras  98-99  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Indonesia  93-96  East Asia & Pacific  Lower middle 
Indonesia  96-98  East Asia & Pacific  Lower middle 
Indonesia  98-99  East Asia & Pacific  Lower middle 
Jamaica  92-93  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Jamaica  93-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Jamaica  96-99  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Jamaica  99-00  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Kazakhstan  02-03  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Malaysia  84-87  East Asia & Pacific  Upper middle 
Malaysia  87-89  East Asia & Pacific  Upper middle 
Malaysia  89-92  East Asia & Pacific  Upper middle 
Malaysia  95-97  East Asia & Pacific  Upper middle 
Mexico  00-02  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle   43
Table A1: List of countries and spells (continued) 
 
Mexico  96-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Mexico  98-00  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Mongolia     95-98           East Asia & Pacific              Low 
Nicaragua  93-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Nicaragua  98-01  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Pakistan 90-92  South  Asia  Low 
Pakistan 92-96  South  Asia  Low 
Panama  00-01  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Panama  01-02  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Panama  91-95  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Panama  95-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Panama  96-00  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Peru  00-01  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Peru  96-00  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Republic of Moldova  01-02  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Republic of Moldova  02-03  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Republic of Moldova  99-01  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Romania  02-03  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Romania  98-00  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Senegal 91-94  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Low 
Senegal 94-01  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Low 
TFYR Macedonia  02-03  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Thailand  98-99  East Asia & Pacific  Lower middle 
Thailand  99-00  East Asia & Pacific  Lower middle 
Trinidad and Tobago  88-92  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Turkey  00-02  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Turkey  02-03  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Turkey  94-00  Europe & Central Asia  Upper middle 
Venezuela  81-87  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Venezuela  87-89  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Venezuela  89-93  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Venezuela  93-95  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Venezuela  95-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Venezuela  96-97  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Venezuela  97-98  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Venezuela  98-00  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Vietnam  02-04  East Asia & Pacific  Low 
Vietnam  98-02  East Asia & Pacific  Low 
Zambia 96-98  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Low 
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Table A2: Other Countries in the Sample That Have Some Outlier Observations 
Country Spell  Region  Income 
Argentina  01-02  Latin America & Caribbean  Upper middle 
Brazil  01-02  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Bulgaria  97-01  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Bulgaria  89-97  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Colombia  80-88  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
El Salvador  95-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Ghana 91-98  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Low 
Honduras  90-92  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Kazakhstan  01-02  Europe & Central Asia  Lower middle 
Madagascar 99-01  Sub-Saharan  Africa  Low 
Malaysia  92-95  East Asia & Pacific  Upper middle 
Mongolia  95-98  East Asia & Pacific  Low 
Peru  90-96  Latin America & Caribbean  Lower middle 
Sri Lanka  85-90  South Asia  Lower middle 




Table A3: Correlation between Measures of Employment and Productivity-intensive Growth 
  Employment-intensive Growth  Productivity-intensive Growth 










Agriculture  1         
Employment-intensive Growth 
Secondary Sector  0.5247  1       
Employment-intensive Growth 
Tertiary Sector  0.7629  0.6417  1     
Agriculture Productivity-
intensive Growth  -0.9064 -0.5305  -0.7173  1     
Secondary Sector 
Productivity-intensive Growth  -0.5159 -0.4914  -0.4957  0.4275  1   
Tertiary Sector Productivity-
intensive Growth  -0.6672  -0.3713  -0.7685  0.5468  0.4080     1 
 
 